THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
1891 · FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY · 1941

ROUND TABLE

10 CENTS

MAY 6 1941

A RADIO DISCUSSION OF

LESSONS FROM EUROPE'S WAR

HUGH M. COLE
LELAND C. DE VINNEY
PAUL H. DOUGLAS

375th BROADCAST IN COOPERATION WITH THE NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY · 163

APRIL 27, 1941

The University of Chicago

ROUND TABLE

Published weekly. 10 cents a copy; five copies, 25 cents; half-year subscription, 26 issues, one dollar. Published by the University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois. Entered as second-class matter January 3, 1939, at the post office at Chicago, Illinois, under the Act of March 3, 1879.

No. 163

NOTE

The supplementary information contained in the footnotes to the following text, developed by staff research, is not to be considered as representing the opinions of the ROUND TABLE *speakers. Following the transcript of the broadcast are questions which readers may wish to use for analysis and discussion. It is hoped that teachers and discussion leaders may find this additional service of the* ROUND TABLE *transcript helpful in their study of the subject discussed in the broadcast.*

LESSONS FROM EUROPE'S WAR

A UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE BROADCAST*

HUGH M. COLE, Instructor in History and Lecturer in the Institute of Military Studies, University of Chicago

LELAND C. DE VINNEY, Instructor in Sociology, University of Chicago

PAUL H. DOUGLAS, Professor of Economics, University of Chicago

* A radio discussion broadcast from the University of Chicago, over the Red Network of the National Broadcasting Company, Sunday, April 27, 1941, at 1:30 P.M., Central Daylight Saving Time.

The ROUND TABLE, oldest educational program continuously on the air, is broadcast entirely without a script. Subjects are chosen because of their social, political, or economic significance. The program has no "ax to grind." In the selection of speakers, the effort is to provide a balanced discussion by participants who have special competence and knowledge. The opinion of each speaker is his own and in no way involves the responsibility of either the University of Chicago or the National Broadcasting Company.

LESSONS FROM EUROPE'S WAR

•

MR. DE VINNEY: On the basis of the twenty months of war during which Hitler has apparently become master of the European continent, we should be able to draw a number of lessons of importance to the United States.[1]

Cole, as a student of military affairs, what questions of importance to Americans do you think we may be able to answer?

MR. COLE: There are a number of very important questions now being raised in connection with the creation of the new American army. These questions can be answered from European experience. The first question is: Should we have a big army—a mass army—or a small professional army? Other questions are: What new types of armaments should we have—guns, tanks—and in what quantities? What types of planes do we need? Do we need bombers, for example, in a majority over interceptor planes, and how many? Can mechanized warfare operate everywhere? We also want to know what new training techniques are needed and how long it takes to train a soldier. Finally, we want to know: Will *offensive*

---

[1] *Active resistance to Germany on the European continent is now maintained only in the British Isles and at Gibraltar. Other points not under direct German control are either under Axis influence (Spain, for example), or neutral (Turkey, Sweden, Switzerland, for example).*

warfare retain its present superiority over *defensive* warfare? This means, in other words, Is *limited* warfare possible?

MR. DE VINNEY: Douglas, as a student of economics, what economic questions do you think may be answered on the basis of the European war experience?

MR. DOUGLAS: I think the war thus far has taught us the answers—or *should* have taught us the answers—to a number of questions. First: How much does it cost a nation to prepare effectively for war or actually to wage war? Second: What proportion of the national income is needed either to prepare for or to carry on war effectively? Then there are other questions: Should the cost of the war be met primarily by loans or primarily by taxes? How may inflation be avoided? And how should the costs of the war be distributed among the rich, the poor, and the middle classes?

MR. COLE: De Vinney, as a student of social organization, what lessons do you think might be studied in the political history of the war to date?

MR. DE VINNEY: I think Americans can draw some information whereby they can answer such questions as: Must democratic government be abandoned by any nation as it prepares for or goes into war? Must freedom of discussion be eliminated and must minorities be suppressed? Can labor protect its gains during a period of intensive preparation for defense or of actual warfare, or must labor be controlled by government? How can national unity and sufficient morale be achieved whereby a nation can protect itself? Perhaps the most important question is: Can liberal democracies in any event achieve sufficient will to war, sufficient will to defense, to match the overriding power of the totalitarian dictatorships in conquest?

While all of these questions are important, perhaps the basic and

most immediate are those relating to military affairs. We are not going to try to answer the question of whether we should or should not get into the current war, but we do want to find out what kinds of things the present war has taught us, irrespective of whether we do or do not go into the war.

Cole, where would you start in stating the military lessons we should have learned from the present war?

MR. COLE: I would restate the phrase you have just used: that regardless of whether we participate in a so-called shooting war or whether we remain on the defensive, there are certain lessons we should learn regardless of what our military policy becomes.

The first lesson we should learn is the necessity of achieving superiority in every one of the arms, particularly superiority in man-power. There is a view that the Germans have won so far because they had more tanks, more guns, and more planes. That is true, but in every single instance to date the Germans have had superior manpower at the point of contact where they have won decisive victories.

MR. DOUGLAS: In other words, economic strangulation is not enough.

MR. COLE: You must have men with arms, trained in the use of those arms, to defeat Germany or to defend yourself against attack.

MR. De VINNEY: Many people were hoping for some sort of military victory over Hitler in the Balkans. Is there any lesson to be drawn from the fact that this did not materialize?

MR. COLE: There is a very important lesson. We hoped in the case of Norway, for example, that mechanized warfare could not operate in mountainous terrain; we hoped that in the Balkans—where the peaks are higher and the roads are rougher and the defiles more narrow—that a mechanized army could not break

through. It did! The *blitzkrieg* operated so successfully that we cannot any longer count upon geographic defenses.

MR. DOUGLAS: The advocates of isolation sometimes say that we would be safe even if England fell because, even though Germany were to take the southern part of South America, we would be protected by the jungles and by the Amazon River and there would be no danger that Germany could advance north to the Caribbean area.

MR. COLE: I believe we can find the answer to that assertion in the details of the Balkan *blitzkrieg*. The theory is that the natural, impenetrable jungles and the Amazon would prevent troops from moving into the northern part of South America. From the experience of the Chaco War in 1934[2] we learned that tanks can move through these jungles, and we have no reason to expect that if the Germans, for example, were in South America they could not cross what we have always believed to be an impenetrable barrier.

MR. DE VINNEY: Is there any reason for us to suppose there is any possibility of the Germans getting into South America merely because they were able to get through the Balkans?

MR. COLE: This problem is hardly a problem to be discussed here in relation to the lessons that we can learn from the European war. I simply want to make this one point: geographical barriers are not significant barriers to the modern mechanized army.

MR. DOUGLAS: And is the sea a barrier against the increasing speed and increasing bomb-carrying capacity of airplanes? Suppose

---

[2] *The century-old dispute between Paraguay and Bolivia over the possession of the Gran Chaco area lying between the two nations broke out in open warfare in the early 1930's. A truce terminated hostilities in 1935, and a final boundary award was made in 1938.*

DISCLOSED PUBLIC DEBT OF GERMANY



EACH COMPLETE SYMBOL EQUALS $5,000,000,000

SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, "FOREIGN COMMERCE WEEKLY," MARCH 8, 1941. CONVERSION OF REICHSMARKS TO DOLLARS MADE IN TERMS OF 1940 VALUE. REICHSMARK = $0.40.

Germany should take the Continent and the Azores, for instance. Would it be possible to bomb New York from a base in the Azores?

MR. COLE: We have not yet seen a complete answer to that question, but certainly there are some things we must learn. We must learn that the bombing radius of a bomber plane has been greatly increased since 1939. We must recognize that now the bombing load—the pay load—of a bomber has been greatly increased, and we have no reason to believe that a bomber cannot drop a pay load of bombs on New York from the European continent.[3]

MR. DOUGLAS: I take it that you tend to agree with Major Seversky's article in the current issue of *Mercury*, in which it is stated that with the improvement of aviation techniques our cities are not immune from attack.[4]

MR. COLE: I would be inclined to agree that Seversky has the right idea. The problem in terms of our present defense program, then, is this: Should we keep large numbers of bombers or interceptors on hand, and should we prepare a program of civilian defense against aircraft attack at once? I think, on the basis of European lessons, we should get busy on this right away.

---

[3] *Press reports on new bomber types indicate already completed aircraft would be able to carry a load of bombs from New York to Düsseldorf, to bomb that city, and to return without refueling or landing.*

[4] *In the May, 1941, issue of the "American Mercury," Major Alexander de Seversky wrote: ". . . . military aircraft with a range of 25,000 miles, equal to the circumference of the globe, seem wholly realistic in the predictable future—in five years at the outside . . . ." and ". . . . bombers . . . . will travel ten hours or more before reaching American objectives . . . . crossing at substratospheric altitudes, perhaps with relief crews, under ideal conditions of comfort."*

MR. DE VINNEY: I gather that you conclude that one lesson we should learn from the war is that we cannot sit tight behind our natural geographic barriers and think we are safe. That means that we are going to have to follow a very definite program of preparation for defense. You have already indicated that you think part of this preparation involves construction of many mechanized units. What other kinds of things must we prepare for, in your judgment, in the light of the European war?

MR. COLE: I think we must learn that we are now dealing with the greatest coordination of the elements of warfare that has ever been seen. We must recognize now that enough men will not win wars; that enough planes and enough tanks will not win wars; that you must have enough of all of these items, *plus* coordination—and coordination as we see it demonstrated by Germany, and as we learn from the European war—comes only from adequate training.

Now, the question in the United States is: Are we going to have time to train, are our present training techniques adequate, and are we really learning from the lessons taught on European battlefields?

MR. DOUGLAS: Two or three years ago Major George Fielding Eliot wrote a book in which he said it was not necessary for the United States to have an army of more than a million and a quarter or a million and a half men. You are saying that that is probably an understatement, in view of the developments of the last two years, even if we confine ourselves purely to the defense of North America.

MR. COLE: That book was written under very different conditions than the conditions we face today. Our Secretary of War, Stimson, in testifying before representatives of this country in Congress, recently stated that an army must be prepared for any contingency. Obviously, it is the military duty of the leaders who

are empowered to defend the state to be ready for any military contingency.[5]

MR. DE VINNEY: In other words, irrespective of what the political policy of this country may be, if we are going to maintain a defense program or offense elsewhere, we shall have to prepare for it.

MR. COLE: Exactly so! There is this one thing: We will perhaps shape our defense program according to our attitude toward *offensive* or *defensive* warfare. That is, we will build more interceptor planes than bomber planes if we are preparing to fight here on this continent alone; but our policy in this country (on the basis of what we have learned in Europe) is constantly tending in the direction of the offensive, on the thesis that if you bomb your potential enemy before he can bomb you, you have taken a great step toward preserving your own independence.

MR. DOUGLAS: In boxing, of course, it is always considered that the best defense is an offense.

MR. DE VINNEY: One frequently hears it maintained that the secret of German success has been a very highly trained, well-equipped, small army; that mass preparation is not necessary if you get adequate equipment and adequate training for a rather small army. Have we any lessons to learn from the European war on this matter?

---

[5] *In testimony before a special Senate defense investigating committee, April 15, 1941, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson said: "... . our forces must be prepared for the possibilities of war in many and varied terrains, it being quite uncertain in what part of North, or South, or Central America, or even possibly other regions it ultimately may be necessary to use them in the defense of this country and its possessions."*

GERMAN TAX RECEIPTS

IN PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL NATIONAL INCOME*



** Taxation data for fiscal years, April, 1933—March, 1941; national income for calendar years, 1933–40.*

MR. COLE: That is an assumption which is not borne out by the facts. The Germans have at least four and a half million men under arms. Of this number probably three million are adequately trained; and two and a half to three million have had combat experience.[6] We have no reason to expect now that a small army can defeat a big army if that big army is adequately trained. It is another old boxing formula: the good little man cannot beat the good big man. He never could in warfare.

MR. DE VINNEY: Can we learn anything about how much time and how many men our training program is going to involve if we are to have a real defense program?

MR. COLE: I think we can learn from the lessons Germany has taught us. We *should* learn—I don't know whether we will. The Germans began to condition their man-power as early as 1935, to make the men who were going to fire the guns "tops." We are now trying to do that in our training camps. As early as 1937 they began to train the troops who were going to fight in 1939 in the specific tactics they were going to use against Poland in 1939. In other words, the German army is not something that was whipped up overnight. Its core is at least five years old and has been conditioned by years in labor camps on the part of the youth groups, and by most under actual combat conditions.

MR. DE VINNEY: How long does that mean it is going to require for us to train soldiers equal in ability, let us say, to the German soldiers?

MR. COLE: An American general told me it would take one year to condition, to toughen up, the bodies of the men who were then going into camp. This gave very little time, it seemed to me,

---

[6] *Recent estimates credit Germany with about 214 divisions and Britain with about 30 divisions.*

for teaching them the use of the arms that they were going to have to use. Let's say we can condition them in six months' time. On the basis of German experience, they ought to have at least one year learning to use the arms which they are going to use on the battlefield. In many cases we do not yet have the arms with which to train them.

MR. DOUGLAS: Isn't it true that each infantry regiment now has infinitely more machine guns attached to it than during the first World War and is much more mechanized?[7]

MR. COLE: It is quite true on paper that in the American army we are trying to catch up with the German lessons in this regard; but in our tables of organization for the present numerical division, we still do not have an adequate number of mortars, machine guns, or automatic rifles to catch up with German requirements.

MR. DE VINNEY: Isn't it true that it takes more than adequate training to make a good army; that you must have morale and confidence between officers and men?

---

[7] *The American infantry regiment (rifle), as constituted on October 1, 1940, comprised, at full strength, 123 commissioned officers, 1 warrant officer, and 3,325 enlisted men, a total personnel of 3,449. Weapons for this regiment were:*

24 caliber .30 machine guns (M1917)
12 caliber .50 machine guns (M2)
18 caliber .30 machine guns, light (M1919A4)
12 .37 mm. anti-tank guns
27 .60 mm. mortars
12 .81 mm. mortars
125 caliber .30 automatic rifles (M1918A2)
1,181 caliber .45 automatic pistols
2,099 caliber .30 rifles (M1—the "Garand")

MR. COLE: Here we have a very important lesson to learn from the European war, and we must learn it from the masters—the men who have won the battles on the European continent thus far. In spite of the fact that Germany is an autocracy and a despotism, the ordinary private soldier is recognized as a man who has the right to think and use initiative; he has a right to ask questions. We should —and we are doing it only very slowly—give the private soldier the right to think and the right to ask questions, and explain to him why he is trained in a certain way, and why he is supposed to act in a certain way. The Germans have a great edge on us in this.

MR. De VINNEY: How about the recruitment of officers and the democratization of social relationships between officers and enlisted men in our training program? Has that developed as far as it should in terms of lessons learned from the European war?

MR. COLE: I think we are beginning to learn something here from the Third Republic—from the fall of what was supposed to be the greatest army in Europe: the French army. In this army the middle-class bourgeoisie provided the officers. They had been constantly fighting the poorer classes who made up the bulk of the army in social and economic strife. It is becoming apparent, on the basis of the study of the French army, that confidence between officers and men is essential. Therefore, in this country our officers should now begin to regard those who carry the gun as social—hardly equals—but, let's say, of some social importance.

MR. De VINNEY: You were saying a while ago, Cole, that the best war of defense is likely to be a war of offense on the basis of present experience in the European war. Should Americans conclude on that basis that they should start invading the European continent and send an A.E.F.?

MR. COLE: I don't know the answer to that because, on past

records, offensive warfare has finally been replaced at long last by defensive warfare when the weapons of the defensive begin to become as good and as powerful as those of the offensive.

I asked this question last year in a series of articles in the *Military Engineer* (one of the professional service journals), and it seemed to me then that as long as the offensive retains its superiority in modern warfare, the authoritarian states have the edge unless the powers of the democracies are willing to take the offensive. Now unless the offensive is immediately superseded by the defensive as having superior strength in warfare, it looks to me as though we should begin to learn some lessons which might perhaps some day mean military intervention.

MR. DOUGLAS: Might it not be possible for England, supported by the United States, to take the defensive on the land and to take the offensive in the air? That is, might it not be possible to keep Germany from England, and not to try to invade the Continent, but for the United States to give Great Britain such a large number of airplanes that she would have superiority in the air to start bombing the German cities and to destroy German morale by incessant bombardment from the air?

MR. COLE: That assumption is one which in this country is particularly dangerous because, on the experience of the European war thus far, we should have learned the lesson that a war of limited participation, limited liability, means being on the losing end. If England is beaten in the next year it will be because England started the war in 1939 on a half-time basis as a war of limited, only limited, participation.

We are fighting total wars. Planes alone will not win the war; ships alone will not win the war. Ships, planes, guns—total participation—win wars, and that is the only thing today.

MR. DE VINNEY: I take it, Cole, that a lesson the United



States should learn in military preparedness is that we should be prepared for total war, all-out war, if we are going to seek to do anything about the situation in Europe. That certainly has ramifications that go far beyond military questions, does it not?

MR. COLE: It reaches very deeply into the economic sphere without any question.

MR. DE VINNEY: That's right! Douglas, what lessons should we have learned in the economic field about the requirements of this totalitarian war in Europe?

MR. DOUGLAS: First: that—whether we merely seek to protect our shores or South America, or whether the nation decides to participate more actively—it is going to cost infinitely more than the first World War; infinitely more than we believed.

---

* *U.S. Department of Commerce, "Foreign Commerce Weekly," March 8, 1941.*

The first World War cost Great Britain $10,000,000,000 a year, and it cost Germany $10,000,000,000 a year. Germany stepped up its expenditures to $20,000,000,000 in the first year of this war, and Britain reduced its expenditures to $7,000,000,000. Those figures, I think, indicate why Germany won such an overpowering victory in the first year.[8] (*See illustrations, pages 6 and 10.*)

MR. COLE: In other words, Douglas, to create a modern army —whether we are going to use it for the offensive or the defensive— we've got to choose between guns and butter. In this country we want guns and butter, and jam and jelly besides, don't we?

MR. DOUGLAS: In order to have an effective army, I think we've got to spend very much more than in the first World War. We must spend perhaps $25,000,000,000 to $30,000,000,000 a year, and it may be necessary to spend even more.

MR. DE VINNEY: If we should decide to participate in the present war in order to defeat Hitler, what proportion of our national income do you think would be required?

MR. DOUGLAS: Germany is now spending between 50 and 60 per cent of her national income; England is spending between 50 and 60 per cent and is not able to hold her own against Germany. Germany is now spending slightly over $20,000,000,000 and will probably levy $5,000,000,000 or $6,000,000,000 upon the occupied countries. To my mind, it will need the expenditure of at least twice that amount by all the countries combined to defeat Germany; and if England puts in $20,000,000,000, we will have to put in at least $30,000,000,000 or possibly more.

---

[8] *Total American expenditures in the World War are estimated at $25,000,000,000; within the last two years the United States has authorized expenditures in the neighborhood of $28,000,000,000, plus $7,000,000,000 for Britain.*

MR. COLE: Isn't it true that we may have to spend a great deal—perhaps nearly the amount you indicate—for the defeat of Germany if we never fight the Germans at all? If we are just going to build . . . .

MR. DOUGLAS: I think that is right. I think our expenditures should be about as much if we merely try to defend America and give some aid to Britain as if we went in more actively.

MR. DE VINNEY: That is, simply a defense program, irrespective of war, is going to involve terrific expenditures in this country when compared with anything we have done before. That raises a number of questions as to how this money is to be secured—does it not?—and what effect that will have on economic affairs. Are there any lessons we should learn from the first World War?

MR. DOUGLAS: Germany fought the first World War not by taxes but by loans. Prices rose enormously; war profits were great; the working classes suffered and finally rebelled. She has learned from her mistakes in the first war and is now raising over half her money by taxes (*see illustration, page 15*), rigidly restricting upper incomes, preventing profiteering, trying to develop the idea that no one is gaining from the war, and trying to make it a national war. I believe that if we are even to prepare against Germany we must follow a similar method.

MR. COLE: That particular assumption interests me because after the last war, in 1918, a great many people believed that it was impossible to plan economically for modern war after the experiences in 1914 and 1918. The Germans have demonstrated since 1933 that it *is* possible to plan for war, and plan for *victory* in war, with economic as well as military plans prepared in advance.

MR. DOUGLAS: That's right! One of the weaknesses of Great Britain has been that she did not plan economically any more than

she planned militarily. She started out on the assumption that, as you say, it would be a limited war; that it was a war of lesser magnitude than 1914; that she need not raise a very large amount of taxation; that she could borrow. The result was credit inflation and an increase in prices, and it was only after the fall of France that she really got into it. She is now spending at the rate of Germany, and she is now limiting maximum incomes and is taxing all incomes above $700 50 per cent or more. But she started late.

MR. De VINNEY: I noticed that the increased expenditures of our defense program are already confronting us with very serious problems of taxation and that right now there is discussion in Congress about whether this tax program should be carried out primarily against the poor through a general sales tax or primarily against those better able to pay by increased levies on incomes. Can we learn any lessons from the war with respect to the answer to this question?

MR. DOUGLAS: There is only one answer to that question. You cannot drive down the standard of life of poor people below the amounts they physically need to live on or else you will have something that no humane society wants or no efficient society wants. You must guarantee a minimum standard for the people; but above that, if you are in for total defense, you must provide that the burden shall be borne according to people's ability to carry that burden.

MR. COLE: Not only does no humane society want the driving down of the standard of living, but your army heads don't want the ordinary man who carries the gun to feel that his wife and children are starving to death at home because society cannot feed them. You've got to feed the common people who, after all, make up the bulk of modern armies.

MR. De VINNEY: There is another question I frequently hear

raised: Must democratic nations abandon democratic government if they are to carry on an efficient defense of their national life?

I wonder if the present war has not demonstrated that this legend is not true; that it is possible for England, for example, to retain—even during total war—at least a representative government that must stand and explain its actions to a Parliament.

MR. DOUGLAS: Can it not be maintained that England actually has more democracy in this period in which she is giving everything that she's got than she had in the period of appeasement; that there is much more criticism of government?

MR. De VINNEY: Very definitely! And I think that in our defense program we can learn—we *should* learn—that we do not need completely to suppress discussion or eliminate minorities; but that one of the essential requirements of the defense of any nation is the maintenance of morale, the maintenance of confidence on the part of all the citizens, that the sacrifices required are being equitably distributed among the population.

MR. COLE: I want to say "Hear! Hear!" to that, because one of the military questions that is not yet answered (and one that the United States may have to answer) is the question: Can a German army, which is made up of men who believe that they have no individual rights or privileges but to die for the fatherland, be beaten offensively or defensively by an army made up of people who believe that they owe the state nothing, that they owe only themselves the ability to keep alive?

I don't know the answer, but we in this country had better find the answer pretty soon!

MR. De VINNEY: We certainly have the necessity of learning that if the democracies are to defend themselves they must demonstrate that the liberal way of life is able to inspire in individuals the willingness to sacrifice and die for the advantages of that way of life.

We feel that Americans should learn from the war experience that in the military area it is necessary not to depend upon matters of terrain but to make an all-out preparation for an army as large, as well equipped, and as well trained as any possible opposing force; that this is going to require tremendous sacrifices in economic life, taking perhaps half of our national income; that this necessarily must be distributed equitably among the various parts of the population; and that if this is to be done it must be done on the basis of a very high degree of national unity and of national morale.

SUGGESTED READINGS

"Billions for Defense," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, March, 1941. *Subtitled "How Can the American People Pay the Costs of Rearmament?" this 215-page issue of the "Annals" will prove a valuable asset to any student studying this problem.*

DRUCKER, PETER F., "Must a War Economy Be Permanent?" *Harper's*, May, 1941.

KEYNES, JOHN MAYNARD, *How to Pay for the War*, New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1940. *A program for paying for the British war effort, emphasizing the possibilities of "compulsory savings" in accomplishing this aim.*

LINDBERGH, CHARLES A., "Letter to Americans," *Collier's*, March 29, 1941. *A statement of the non-interventionist argument by one of its most distinguished American adherents.*

MENDERSHAUSEN, HORST, *The Economics of War*, New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1940.

PHILLIPS, LIEUT. COL. THOMAS R., "Traditionalism and Military Depot," *Infantry Journal*, March, 1941.

PRENTICE, LIEUT. COL. AUGUSTIN M., "Air Assault on Cities," *Infantry Journal*, April, 1941.

"Two Worlds," *Nation*, March 22, 1941. *A special supplement containing eight articles by such authorities as Walter Millis, Konrad Heiden, Harold Laski, and Alvarez del Vayo, speculating upon the state of the world in the event of a Hitler victory and in the event of a Hitler defeat, with some attention to what these events would mean to America.*

WERNER, MAX, *Battle for the World*, New York: Modern Age Books, Inc., 1941.

OBJECTIVE QUESTIONS FOR EXAMINATION

The answers to the following questions may be found in the text of the broadcast, and page references are provided to assist in locating the answers.

*

1. List three of the questions Americans are asking about the military lessons to be learned from the European war. Page 2.
2. Similarly, list three of the economic questions to which we may find answers in the present conflict. Page 3.
3. Name three political questions to which we Americans may find answers in the war. Page 3.
4. Besides "more tanks, more guns, more planes," a vital role in German victories in military engagements has been played by what additional factor of superiority? Page 4.
5. Mr. Cole suggests the Chaco War of 1934 demonstrated what fact about mechanized army operations in jungles? Page 5.
6. Secretary of War Stimson has stated our army may be called upon to fight where? Pages 8–9.
7. Define a "war of limited liability." Page 14.
8. Summarize the cost figures per year of the first war to Great Britain and Germany. Page 16.
9. How do these figures (given in question eight) compare with those of the present war? Page 16.
10. Costs of the present war represent what percentage of the British and German national incomes? Page 16.
11. What was the major financing technique in the first war? In the present one? Page 17.

QUESTIONS FOR ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The following questions of wider scope, intended for discussion, are suggested by the broadcast, and answers may be found in the literature on the subject listed in the section "Suggested Readings," found on page 21.

*

1. What do you feel are the most important lessons America can learn from the European war in these fields:

   a) Military? *b*) Economic? *c*) Sociopolitical?

2. If you were assigned to the job of building an American army, navy, and air force, what objectives would you establish in terms of quantity and quality of men and machines? What political objectives do you think this force should be adequate to attain?

3. What lessons has the war taught about the coordination of military, economic, and sociopolitical problems in wartime? Do you agree or disagree with the thesis that these three are so interlocked in modern war as to make the analysis of one impossible without the analysis of the others? Give examples.

4. Analyze the special lessons of the European war as far as defense of the United States in North America, in the Western Hemisphere, or in other parts of the world is concerned.

5. Consider the thesis of the "war of limited liability." Do you agree that such a concept is invalidated by the total-war techniques of Naziism? Discuss.

6. What is your estimate of the "cost" of financing defense or war? What percentage of America's national income do you think will be taken by preparations for defense or war? What effect do you think this draining of money will have on the average American's standard of living?

The Listeners' Round Table . . . .

The ROUND TABLE *invites listeners to comment upon the broadcast, and the following excerpts are from letters received following the discussion of "Which Road for America—Staying Out of War or the Military Defeat of Germany?" April 20, 1941.*

*

Dig In

My own stand on the subject of yesterday's debate is that of militant, all-out opposition to Hitler's "new" order, and consequently I would like to see the U.S. drop all pretense and dig into this tough job of removing the curse of Hitlerism from this earth.

M. A., Pennsylvania

*

Facts

Senator Nye stated the facts as they really are and as many other people think who do not have the privilege of making it known. More power to him.

C. J. A., South Dakota

*

Hang Separately

The senators who have appeared on the ROUND TABLE as isolationists always talk like parrots. Over and over they say "we mustn't go to war." But do they give any reasons? No, they don't. They never answer the arguments of the other side that Hitler has said many times that the U.S.A. was an "inside job"—he'd not have to make war on us. They never answer how to combat the known infiltration of Japanese and Germans into South America now. They never see how Norway wanted peace and wouldn't join Britain and was invaded; that Holland wanted peace and wouldn't join with Britain and was invaded; the same was true of Poland, of Belgium, etc. If the Balkans had *together* defied Germany they would be free today. The isolationists can learn *nothing*. Unless we hang together—the free countries—we'll sure hang separately, as so many have done already.

M. P., Connecticut

*

Logic

On the ROUND TABLE today Mr. Schuman gave the only logical presentation of our present situation.

C. P. F., Ohio

Get It?

Many speakers today are expressing fear that Hitler will invade America if the British fleet goes down. On the other hand, they propose that we throw our all into the war and invade Europe in order to annihilate Germany. In other words, they preach that it would be easier to defend America on the other side of the Atlantic than on this. I don't get it.

O. S. A., Missouri

Water

Senator Nye said that by going to war we would be committing suicide, and we would. Someone else said that other countries in Europe also said it was suicide to enter the war against Germany and later were run over by the Nazi war machine. That was true, but *not one* country had 3,000 miles of water between itself and Germany.

W. W., Wisconsin

(*Continued next page*)

TIMES HAVE CHANGED

*

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE
IS BROADCAST AT

2:30 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time
1:30 P.M. Eastern Standard Time
1:30 P.M. Central Daylight Time
12:30 P.M. Central Standard Time
11:30 A.M. Mountain Standard Time
10:30 A.M. Pacific Standard Time

over most of the stations of the Red Network of the
National Broadcasting Company

Hissed

The Senator spoke with the sublime conceit of an ignorant man when he stated that in his judgment the tying to England was like tying to a dead horse. When he stated this I could not help remembering an address made by him lately when the names of Hitler and Stalin were cheered and those of the President and Churchill were hissed. I do not suppose that it occurs to him that, if Hitler wins this war, this nation of ours will have to continue indefinitely to be largely engrossed in keeping up a stupendous army and navy.

C. B. G., Jr., Maryland

*

"Dead Horse"

In your broadcast this afternoon I thought Senator Nye stood head and shoulders above the rest, in delivery and in what he had to say.

If it is possible, I would be pleased if you could extend my congratulations to Senator Nye. I agree with him nearly 100 per cent, but think he wasn't quite accurate in calling the British Empire a "dead horse." From what we have seen in the last year I would say, rather, that "The Old Gray Mare Ain't What She Used To Be" but has some good kicks in her yet. But whether the "horse" is dead or alive, I can't express my feelings (in the few lines to which I will limit this letter) on the thought of our underwriting the continuance of the British Empire against any and all foes whom she may pick up.

H. L. D., New York

WHO DO YOU KNOW IN

Pondicherry
Tegucigalpa
Kathmandu
Paramaribo

?

THERE ARE ROUND TABLE SUBSCRIBERS IN

Guanajuata
Kowloong
Kihei Maui
Okotoks
and
Ketchikan

●

Foreign subscriptions are only $3.00 a year. Western Hemisphere: $2.00

.....

Please send the University of Chicago Round Table for:

☐ *One Year* ☐ *Six Months*

Name.....

Address.....

City.....

State.....

TRANSCRIPT SUBSCRIPTIONS

ONE YEAR'S SUBSCRIPTION.....$2.00 SIX MONTHS'.....$1.00

FOR SINGLE COPIES OF THE BROADCASTS LISTED BELOW SEND TEN CENTS IN COIN TO THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS. ANY FIVE PAST OR FUTURE BROADCASTS, 25 CENTS.

LISTS

OF 1938–39 TRANSCRIPTS STILL IN PRINT WILL BE SENT UPON REQUEST. STUDENTS AND TEACHERS WILL FIND THESE ISSUES TO BE VALUABLE COMMENTARIES UPON EVENTS OF THE PERIOD.

Nos.

1940

98. *The Jews*
101. *Tariff Walls*
102. *War Myths*
104. *Is America's Economic Frontier Closed?*
105. *Must the World Unite?*
106. *Can We Protect America?*
108. *The Archbishops Look at America*
111. *Where's That War Boom?*
112. *The Trojan Horse*
113. *Blitzkrieg, May, 1940*
114. *America and the Peacemongers*
115. *Babies Cost Money*
117. *Have We Time to Think?*
118. *Italy Marches.* (June 16, 1940)
119. *America's Capacity to Arm*
120. *Economic Union for the Americas*
121. *Civil Liberties and the Fifth Column*
122. *M-Day and America*
124. *Should America Conscript Men Now?*
125. *The New France*
126. *What Really Happened at Havana?*
128. *Blitzkrieg on Britain*
129. *Should America Aid Britain?*
130. *Should America Feed Europe?*

Nos.

131. *Can Germany Conquer Latin America?*
132. *Conscript Wealth, Too?*
134. *Will Hitler Attack America Next?*
137. *Warmongers and Appeasers*
138. *Polls and the Election*
140. *World Revolution*
141. *Art and Our Warring World*
142. *The Soviet Union and America*
143. *Is Hitler Revolutionizing Britain?*
144. *Where Are Those 50,000 Planes?*
146. *1951: The Next Decade in Education*

1941

147. *More Aid to Britain Now?*
148. *Is This Our War?*
149. *Morale: First Line of Defense?*
150. *Can Capitalism Defend America?*
152. *Can the Americas Be Invaded?*
153. *Guns or Butter?*
154. *Dilemma in the Far East*
155. *How to Fight Nazi Propaganda*
156. *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*
157. *Strikes and National Defense*
158. *Defense Economics*
159. *Should America Convoy to Britain?*
160. *Balkan Blitzkrieg*
161. *War Aims and Peace Aims*
162. *Which Road for America?* April 20

ALL ROUND TABLE TRANSCRIPTS CONTAIN ADDED FACTUAL MATERIAL IN THE FORM OF GRAPHS, MAPS, PICTOGRAPHS, FOOTNOTES, BIBLIOGRAPHIES, ETC.

TIMES HAVE CHANGED

2:30 P.M. EASTERN DAYLIGHT SAVING TIME

City	Call Letters	Kilocycles	City	Call Letters	Kilocycles
Boston, Mass.	WNAC	1260	Portland, Me.	WCSH	970
Buffalo, N.Y.	WBEN	930	Providence, R.I.	WJAR	920
New York, N.Y.	WEAF	660	Rochester, N.Y.	WHAM	1180
Philadelphia, Pa.	KYW	1060	Schenectady, N.Y.	WGY	810
Pittsburgh, Pa.	WCAE	1250	Wilmington, Del.	WDEL	1150

1:30 P.M. EASTERN STANDARD TIME

Allentown, Pa.	WSAN	1470	Johnstown, Pa.	WJAC	1400
Altoona, Pa.	WFBG	1340	Lakeland, Fla.	WLAK	1340
Asheville, N.C.	WISE	1400	Lima, Ohio	WLOK	1240
Atlanta, Ga.	WSB	750	Miami, Fla.	WIOD	610
Baltimore, Md.	WFBR	1300	Nashville, Tenn.	WSM	650
Charleston, S.C.	WTMA	1250	Norfolk, Va.	WTAR	790
Charlotte, N.C.	WSOC	1240	Raleigh, N.C.	WPTF	680
Cleveland, Ohio	WTAM	1100	Richmond, Va.	WMBG	1380
Columbia, S.C.	WIS	560	Savannah, Ga.	WSAV	1340
Columbus, Ohio	WCOL	1230	Springfield, Ohio	WIZE	1340
Dayton, Ohio	WING	1410	Tampa, Fla.	WFLA	970
Detroit, Mich.	WWJ	950	Toledo, Ohio	WSPD	1370
Florence, S.C.	WOLS	1230	Washington, D.C.	WRC	980
Grand Rapids, Mich.	WOOD	1300	Winston-Salem, N.C.	WSJS	600
Greenville, S.C.	WFBC	1330	Zanesville, Ohio	WHIZ	1240
Jacksonville, Fla.	WJAX	930			

1:30 P.M. CENTRAL DAYLIGHT SAVING TIME

Chicago, Ill.	WMAQ	670	Memphis, Tenn.	WMC	790
Fort Wayne, Ind.	WGL	1450			

12:30 P.M. CENTRAL STANDARD TIME

Amarillo, Texas	KGNC	1440	Mankato, Minn.	KYSM	1230
Birmingham, Ala.	WBRC	960	Milwaukee, Wis.	WTMJ	620
Bismarck, N.D.	KFYR	550	Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minn.	KSTP	1500
Bristol, Tenn.	WOPI	1490	New Orleans, La.	WSMB	1350
Duluth, Minn., and Superior, Wis.	WEBC	1320	Oklahoma City, Okla.	WKY	930
El Paso, Texas	KTSM	1380	Omaha, Neb.	WOW	590
Evansville, Ind.	WGBF	1280	Pittsburg, Kans.	KOAM	810
Fargo, N.D.	WDAY	970	Rochester, Minn.	KROC	1340
Hattiesburg, Miss.	WFOR	1400	St. Cloud, Minn.	KFAM	1450
Jackson, Miss.	WJDX	1300	St. Louis, Mo.	KSD	550
Kansas City, Mo.	WDAF	610	Shreveport, La.	KTBS	1480
Kingsport, Tenn.	WKPT	1400	Sioux Falls, S.D.	KSOO	1140
Laurel, Miss.	WAML	1340	Springfield, Mo.	KGBX	1260
Little Rock, Ark.	KARK	920	Terre Haute, Ind.	WBOW	1230
Louisville, Ky.	WAVE	970	Tulsa, Okla.	KVOO	1170
Madison, Wis.	WIBA	1310	Wichita, Kans.	KANS	1240

11:30 A.M. MOUNTAIN STANDARD TIME

Albuquerque, N.M.	KOB	1030	Phoenix, Ariz.	KTAR	620
Billings, Mont.	KGHL	790	Pocatello, Ida.	KSEI	930
Boise, Ida.	KIDO	1380	Safford, Ariz.	KGLV	1450
Bozeman, Mont.	KRBM	1450	Salt Lake City, Utah	KDYL	1320
Butte, Mont.	KGIR	1370	Tucson, Ariz.	KVOA	1290
Denver, Colo.	KOA	850	Twin Falls, Ida.	KTFI	1270
Helena, Mont.	KPFA	1240	Yuma, Arizona	KYUM	1240

10:30 A.M. PACIFIC STANDARD TIME

Fresno, Cal.	KMJ	580	San Francisco, Cal.	KPO	680
Los Angeles, Cal.	KFI	640	Seattle, Wash.	KOMO	950
Medford, Ore.	KMED	1440	Spokane, Wash.	KHQ	590
Portland, Ore.	KGW	620			

STATIONS CARRYING ROUND TABLE BY TRANSCRIPTION

Cincinnati, Ohio	WSAI	1360	10:30 P.M. E.S.T.
Honolulu, T.H.	KGU	760	

The Effect of the BLITZKRIEG on the Economic Order

of Britain: *Herman Finer*

Visiting Professor of Political Science
From the London School of Economics, University of London

of the U.S.A.: *Theodore O. Yntema*

Professor of Statistics; Director of Research, Cowles Commission

William H. Spencer

Dean of the School of Business, Professor of Business Law

(ALL ARE MEMBERS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO FACULTY)

•

MAY 4, 1941

•

SUGGESTED READINGS

DRUCKER, PETER F., "Poor Man's War," *Saturday Evening Post,* July 20, 1940.
SOULE, GEORGE, "Fear of Plenty," *New Republic,* March 31, 1941.
SCHUBART, W. H., "War and America," *Vital Speeches,* April 1, 1941.
FLEMING, H. M., "Don't Expect Inflation," *Harper's,* September, 1940.

[PRINTED IN U.S.A.]